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Review Article
Chemical and Biological Warfare preparing to meet the Threat
S. Sophie, S.U. Haq, M. R. Khan*
Departments of Anesthesiology and Surgery*, The Aga Khan University Hospital, Karachi. 
Introduction
Till the recent past, there was a widespread tendency
to think about defence against chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) agents as unnecessary, as someone else's
responsibility, or as simply too difficult.1 The threat of
exposure to such agents has traditionally been considered a
military issue. Several recent events, however, have
demonstrated that civilians may also be exposed to these
agents;2-4 and in the wake of recent atrocities there has been
renewed apprehension regarding the deployment of
chemical and biological weapons.5
Potential sources of exposure for civilian population
include acts of terrorism, inadvertent releases from
domestic chemical weapon stockpiles, direct military
attacks, and industrial accidents. The hostile use of CBW
agents would be likely to cause significant impact on health
care systems. Patient might present in unprecedented
numbers, and demands for intensive care might overwhelm
medical resources. Special medications or vaccines, not
generally available in standard pharmaceutical stocks,
might be required. Health care professionals and laboratory
personnel might need added physical protection. All these
problems can be overwhelming for the health care system,
but the efficacy of the medical response could be improved
if health care professionals were better aware of symptoms,
pathophysiology and treatment of agents likely to be used.5
There has been an increasing feeling amongst hospital
clinicians that there should be more awareness and
preparation about the management of casualties after a
terrorist attack using CBW agents.5-7
We present an overview of the risk that chemical and
biological warfare agents presently pose to the civilian
population; and a discussion of the presentation and
principles of management of exposure to such agents.
Historical Background
The use of chemical and biological warfare agents as
weapons has been attempted throughout the history. Biological
warfare has evolved from the crude use of cadavers to
contaminate water supplies, to the development of specialized
munitions for battlefield and covert use. Recognition of the
potential impact of infectious disease on armies resulted in the
crude use of filth, cadavers, animal carcasses and contagion as
weapons. These have been used to contaminate water supplies
since antiquity, through the Napoleonic era, and into the 21st
century. Allegations have been made since World War I, but
these have not been confirmed because of the absence of
microbiological or epidemiological data.8 These incidents
underscore the difficulty in differentiating biological attacks
from naturally occurring epidemics and endemic diseases, and
emphasize the increased risk of epidemics during hostilities
because of deteriorating hygiene, sanitation and public health
infrastructure.9 The practice of ascribing naturally occurring
epidemic or endemic diseases to alleged biological attacks for
propaganda purposes, demonstrates the perception of
psychological vulnerability to the threat of biological warfare.
Despite all the limitations, concern continues to grow regarding
the possibility of proliferation or enhancement of state
sponsored offensive biological weapons programs and the
possible use of biological weapons by terrorist organizations.
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Potential Sources of Exposure to Civilian Population
1.  Terrorist attacks
Terrorism has been defined as the use or threat of
violence to sow panic in a society, to weaken or overthrow
its leaders, or to bring about political change.10 Terrorists
have previously used conventional means of violence, but
several recent events have demonstrated that some terrorists
now have access to weapons of greater lethality, including
chemical and biological agents.10-12 Recent technical
advances, easy access to raw materials, the ready
availability of technical information, and the possible
support of terrorists by certain hostile foreign governments
have all contributed to the proliferation of CBW agents.13,14
The most publicized use of chemical agents by terrorists
against a civilian population was sarin vapor release in the
Tokyo subway, which resulted in 12 deaths and more than
5500 casualties.4,15 Threats against civilians by terrorists
with CBW agents have also been made in California, Chile,
and Germany.16
2.  Military usage / Stockpiles
Uncommonly, civilian populations may become the
direct targets of military attacks with CBW agents. They
may also potentially sustain unintentional collateral injuries
when their own nation's military uses chemical and
biological weapons against enemy forces. Few cases of
intentional use of CBW agents by military units against
civilians have been documented, including the Iraqi attack
on Kurdish population, and the recent use of nerve gas in
Russia.17,18 The accidental release of CBW agents from
military stockpiles remains another potential threat to the
population.
3.  Industrial incidents
A number of agents that have been used as chemical
weapons, are routinely used in a variety of industrial
processes. Inadvertent release of these chemicals, or
terrorist attacks aimed at storage and transportation
facilities, have the potential to threaten surrounding
communities and may result in acutely life-threatening
emergencies.19 
Factors affecting the Severity of CBW Attacks
1.  Type of release
The severity of attacks by CBW agents depends in part
on the dispersal method used.5 CBW release into water supplies
or food chains produce fewer casualties than airborne release
(aerosolized or powdered preparation), as this is not easily
detectable, and secondarily causes food and water supply
contamination. Several factors influence casualty rates after an
air borne attack. Point deployment describes release from a
single source. Line deployment is release from a moving
vehicle; a wide cone of dispersal occurs if line deployment
occurs perpendicular to prevailing wind.5 Explosive
deployment partially destroys the agent as high temperatures
resulting from initial explosion degrade chemical agents.
2.  Volatility
Volatility is the tendency of a liquid to evaporate and
form vapors. At usual atmospheric temperatures and
pressures, most CBW agents are in liquid form.20,21 After
the detonation of ammunition containing a CBW agent; the
agent is dispersed primarily as a suspension of fine liquid
droplets. The vapors of all CBW agents in general are
heavier than air. Therefore, the exposed individuals are
safest if they are able to ascend to a higher point, such as the
top floor of a building.
3.  Persistence
Persistence is inversely related to volatility. The
more volatile an agent, the quicker it evaporates and
disperses and vice a versa. Military CBW agents are
intended to be persistent, or semi-persistent. This is
clinically relevant, as persistent agents are slower to
evaporate and will remain in contact with body surfaces for
longer periods causing harmful effects. Such agents also
pose greatest threat to rescue and medical personnel, as
there is a risk of secondary exposure and contamination
from patients and the surrounding environment.22,23
4.  Toxicity
Toxicity is defined as the potential for an agent to
cause injury to biological systems.24 Two important
concepts related to the toxicity of CBW agents are lethality
and incapacitating effects. The cyanides and nerve agents
are the most lethal of the CBW agents, and can cause death
within minutes.20 The incapacitating effects of CBW agents
can be even more important than their lethality.22 The
military utility of these agents may result in the diversion of
military resources to casualty evacuation and the provision
of medical care.
5.  Latency
Latency refers to the time delay between the
exposure or absorption of an agent and the onset of clinical
manifestations. This is as much important for chemical
weapons as that for biological weapons. The individuals
who have been exposed to any agent with significant
clinical latency may require medical monitoring and
quarantine for many days.22 This need for monitoring a
large number of exposed individuals can potentially
overwhelm the resources of medical facilities.
Agents used as Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
The rapid identification of an unknown agent may
assist in determining early medical and public health
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interventions.19
A.  Chemical Agents
I.  Nerve Agents (Sarin, Tabun, Soman, VX)
They are extremely toxic, odorless, tasteless and
colorless. They are structurally related to organophosphorus
compounds (insecticides), and are irreversible inhibitors of
cholinesterase enzymes.25 Their administration results in
cholinergic crisis followed by respiratory failure and
polyneuropathy. A triphasic clinical syndrome develops
after exposure.5
1.  Cholinergic Phase 
Acetylcholine (Ach) accumulation may result in
death from bronchoconstriction, vocal cord paralysis,
bradycardia and convulsions.5 This phase lasts for 24-48
hours and requires intensive care. Management includes
Atropine, Oximes and Magnesium.
2.  Intermediate Syndrome 
It begins after the cholinergic phase and lasts for 4-18
days26 depending on the de-novo synthesis rate of
Acetylcholinesterase (AchE). Usually 1% of pre exposure
AchE function is recovered per day. This phase is
characterized by muscle weakness particularly of diaphragm
associated with respiratory failure and cranial nerve palsies.
3.  Delayed Polyneuropathy 
This phase occurs 7-14 days after exposure.5 It is
characterized by symmetrical peripheral muscle weakness
in addition to sensory disturbances. The cause of
polyneuropathy is thought to be inactivation of another
enzyme (neuropathy target esterase). Persistent postural
imbalance, shoulder stiffness and blurring of vision have
been reported years after exposure.5
Treatment  
Pyridostigmine Bromide may be used as a
pretreatment by emergency personnel for whom exposure to
nerve agents is expected. It is not a true pre treatment but an
antidote enhancer.5 It is a reversible competitive carbamate
ester antagonist of AchE. The rationale of treatment is that
pyridostigmine carbamylation of AchE binding sites
produces a reservoir of temporarily inactivated AchE. After
exposure, nerve agents are unable to bind to the
carbamylated enzyme.
Atropine and oximes are effective antidotes if
administered early after exposure.27 Atropine antagonizes
the muscarinic side effects if administered early after
exposure. Atropine is given in repeated dosing till pupillary
dilatation occurs28 and heart rate is more than 80/min.
Atropine infusion is advocated for resistant bradycardia.5
Oximes reverse nicotinic receptor dysfunction.5 It
reduces or reverses paralysis. Oximes detoxify unbounded
agent molecules. Pralidoxime can be used in children and
adults. Therapeutic range is 4ug/ml. The possibility of re-
inhibition of reactivated AchE should be borne in mind. It
maybe amenable to treatment using edrophonium.5
Other drugs may also be used including
benzodiazepines for convulsions5,29 and clonidine to control
cholinergic symptoms.30 Magnesium can be used to reduce
presynaptic Ach release. Adrenal medulla stimulation in
acute toxicity may produce positive inochronotropism
necessitating alpha and beta adrenoceptor blockade.5
II.  Blistering Agents
Vesicants can be classified into 2 main groups:
arsenicals and mustards.
Mustard gas and Lewisite are liquids which cause
chemical burns and blistering to all epithelial tissues. After
inhalation or ingestion, systemic manifestations include
respiratory failure, blindness, vomiting, pancytopenia and
cancer.
Mustard gas: [bis (2chloroethyl) sulphide] is a
colorless or pale yellow oily liquid that smells faintly of
garlic or mustard.31 Atmospheric release occurs through
explosive aerosolization. Its persistence places medical
responders at greater risk of intoxication. Wearing of
protective clothes and decontamination of casualties and
responders is essential.
Mustard gas forms highly reactive sulphonium ions
in the body, which alkylate DNA and enzymes. There is a
period of latency between exposure and the development of
symptoms.5 Suspected exposure necessitates careful clinical
observation and review of the patient. Cutaneous
manifestations after 4-12 hours include erythema, edema,
and first degree burns; vesication occurs with greater
exposure. Necrosis and spreading vesication is seen within
minutes of the exposure. Intravenous fluids and burns
protocol is required.
Ocular symptoms occur in 85% of patients. Corneal
edema is followed by vesication and corneal sloughing.
Vision recovers by corneal revascularisation over a period
of weeks. Exposure to high doses may lead to permanent
blindness.32
Respiratory problems occur in over 70% of victims5
and include dry cough, hoarseness, bronchospasm and
airway collapse distal to areas of sloughed respiratory
epithelium. Lung damage may be permanent and can induce
COPD. Acute upper airway obstruction may require
cricothyroidotomy, though this may be technically difficult.
Bone marrow suppression may occur.
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III. Choking Agents 
They are the classical agents of chemical warfare.
Chlorine and phosgene were first used in 1915.5 Chlorine,
phosgene and chloropicrin are highly volatile liquids. After
inhalation of their vapor, early respiratory distress occurs
followed by a variable latent period, following which toxic
pulmonary edema and permanent lung damage may occur
in survivors of acute phase.
Chlorine is a greenish yellow gas with a distinctive
smell which provides adequate warning. It is an oxidizing
agent and reaction with water liberates hypochlorous acid,
hydrochloric acid and O2 free radicals; all of which cause
tissue damage. Initial exposure causes eye pain,
blepharospasm and lacrimation. 
Phosgene being 4 times denser than air remains close
to the ground. Gas dissolves slowly in water to form CO2
and hydrochloric acid. Slow dissolution allows phosgene to
enter respiratory tissue without significant upper airway
damage. Necrosis follows inflammation of delicate terminal
airways and alveoli. Alveolar capillaries leak large volumes
of serum causing pulmonary edema and respiratory failure.
Hypoxemia and ischemia leads to multiorgan dysfunction.
Morbidity and mortality are related to the degree of
pulmonary damage. 
Management of choking agents is supportive.
Inhaled or intravenous steroids in high doses are
recommended. Antibiotics and leukotriene inhibitors may
prove useful. Oral Zafirlukast 40-80 mg 12 hourly for the
initial 48 hours and Glutathione may lessen respiratory
damage after phosgene poisoning.5,33
IV.  Vomiting, incapacitating and harassing Agents
Vomiting agents (such as adamsite and
diphenylchloroarsine), tear gases [(such as 2-
chlorobenzalmalononitrile (Csgas)] and capsacain spray are
sensory irritants that are used to temporarily incapacitate
targets. Psychoactive drugs (such as LSD and
cannabinoids)5 may also be used, they are severely
debilitating but are less likely to require intensive care
treatment. With psychochemicals, death is usually
accidental while subject is hallucinating or blinded.
V.  Blood Agents
Hydrocyanic acid and cyanogen chloride are
metabolic poisons which are fatal within 15 minutes of a
lethal dose. 5 It is highly volatile, disseminated as a vapor
and rapidly disperses throughout the atmosphere to near
toxic concentrations. It interrupts cellular respiration by
inhibiting cytochrome oxidases. The resulting metabolic
acidosis and tissue hypoxia leads to convulsions and cardio-
respiratory arrest. Inhalation causes high fatality before
hospitalization. Other symptoms are dizziness, confusion
and coma. Arterial blood gas shows metabolic acidosis.
Antidote is Na-thiosulphate which converts cyanate to non
toxic thiocyanate. It is administered in conjunction with
sodium nitrite which converts Hb to met-Hb (which binds
cyanide) and hydroxycobalamin which reacts with cyanide
to form cyanocobalamin. Infusion of norepinephrine may be
required to counteract hypotensive side effects of sodium
nitrite.
VI.  Toxins
Saxitoxin, Ricin and Botulinum toxin are biological
products and are the most toxic chemicals that are produced
by living organisms.  They are considered by some to be
chemical weapons as their effects do not require replication
in humans.
Botulinum Toxin 
Clostridium botulinum produces 7 distinct but
chemically and functionally distinct neurotoxins [A-G].
Neurotoxin A is 500 times more toxic than sarin nerve gas.5
Aerosolisation is the most likely method of deployment but
sabotage of food supplies may also occur. All serotypes bind
to presynaptic receptors at cholinergic synapses.
Acetylcholine synthesis is permanently inhibited.
Functional recovery occurs by genesis of new terminal
boutons. The toxin blocks neurotransmission at
neuromuscular junction, postganglionic parasympathetic
synapses and peripheral ganglia. One to four days after
exposure (depending on the dose inhaled), bulbar palsy and
ocular symptoms occur, followed by progressive
symmetrical descending weakness that culminates in
respiratory failure requiring prolonged ventilatory support.5
Standard decontamination procedures are sufficient to
prevent exposure of health care workers during early phase
of treatment after deliberate deployment of botox. Botox is
inactivated in 12 hours.5 Early ventilatory support is
associated with a fatality of less than 5%. A trivalent
antitoxin exists for serotypes A, B and E, which appears
effective if given shortly after oral ingestion of botox. A
heptavalent antitoxin exists for all serotypes of botox but its
human efficacy is not known.5
Ricin is a protein derived from the seeds of the castor
plant Ricinus Communis. Waste from the commercial
production of castor oil contains 5% ricin, making it easy
for such a substance to fall in the hands of terrorists. It acts
by interrupting protein synthesis in cells. Ingestion causes
abdominal pain and diarrhea. Inhalation of high doses is
fatal. Low doses are associated with drowsiness, confusion,
convulsions, coma, extreme weakness and cardio
respiratory arrest progressing to multi-organ failure and
death. Treatment is supportive.
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Saxitoxin is produced by dinoflagellate sea
organisms. It is concentrated in shellfish and is responsible
for cases of paralytic shellfish poisoning. It is 20 times more
potent than sarin nerve gas. It inhibits sodium ion channels.
Ingestion produces abdominal pain and diarrhea. Inhalation
is rapidly fatal and characterized by bulbar palsy,
respiratory and cardiac failure. Treatment is supportive and
neurological symptoms are not reversible.
B.  Biological Agents
These are defined as living organisms, whatever
their nature, or infective material derived from them, which
are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or
plants. Like chemical weapons, biological weapons are also
classified according their intended target. Those chosen for
use are similar in character; they are released in low dose
into an unprotected population that has poor natural
immunity5 and consistent production of a rapidly occurring
high rate of fatality or incapacitance.
1.  Viruses
The viruses used in biological warfare are highly
infectious and lethal e.g. those producing viral hemorrhagic
fever (VHF). VHF describes a range of symptoms that are
caused by a variety of RNA viruses e.g. Crimean Congo
fever, Ebola virus and yellow fever, viral encephalitides and
Variola. Treatment beyond supportive measures is not
available. Isolation and contact precautions are required.5
Viral Encephalitides: There are three members of the
genus Alpha virus that cause viral encephalitis in humans,
Venezuelan Eastern and Western5,34,35 and equine
encephalitis viruses (VEE,EEE and WEE). They are highly
infectious (10-100 organisms cause clinical symptoms) and
stable when weaponised. Mortality may be as high as 70%.
No specific therapy exists, and treatment is therefore
supportive. Vaccines are available but the WEE and EEE
vaccines are poorly immunogenic requiring repeated
immunization.5
Smallpox is caused by Variola, which is highly
infective (10-100 organisms cause infection) when
aerosolized, and stable when weaponized. It has a high
mortality rate (3% in vaccinated, 30% in unvaccinated);
death resulting from pneumonia.36 Cessation of routine
vaccination has increased the susceptibility of the
population to variola infection.5 Cidofovir, a DNA
polymerase inhibitor used to treat cytomegalvirus in AIDS
patients appears to be effective in vitro when given early
after infection.5
2.  Bacteria
They are easy to culture and have high infectivity
and lethality. Common agents used include Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague) and Francisella
tularensis (tularemia).
Bacillus Anthracis is an aerobic Gram positive, rod-
shaped spore forming bacteria that primarily infects the
herbivores, particularly cattle, sheep, goats, and horses. The
reservoir of B. Anthracis is the soil and the organism is
distributed worldwide.5 Humans usually contact anthrax
through close contact with infected animal products
particularly hair and hides. Three clinical presentations are
usually seen in humans.37
1. Cutaneous anthrax results from inoculation of
spores through skin abrasions. It appears within 5 days of
exposure, beginning with small pruritic papules which form
vesicles. These rupture within a week to leave an ulcer that
resolves as a black eschar.
2. Inspiration of anthrax spores can result in the
highly lethal inhalational form of the disease (woolsorters
disease). Inhaled spores reach the alveoli and are
phagocytosed to hilar and mediastinal lymph nodes and a
large amount of toxin is released into the circulation.
Initially there is an insidious onset with malaise, fatigue,
myalgia, non-productive cough and fever. Over 1-4 days, a
necrotising hemorrhagic mediastinitis ensues causing chest
discomfort, acute dyspnea and stridor. Hemorrhagic
meningitis with meningism and coma occurs in 50% of
patients. Multi-organ failure which is refractory to treatment
is the cause of death within 24-36 hrs. Historically,
Penicillin was used for treatment, but now it has proved
possible to bioengineer penicillin resistance in B. Anthracis.
Currently, treatment with Ciprofloxacin is commenced as
soon as possible. Chemoprophylaxis can be done with
ciprofloxacin or doxycycline, which is continued for 4
weeks or until 3 doses of vaccine are given. Attenuated
vaccine is available (Michigan vaccine) and injected
subcutaneously at 0, 2 and 4 weeks then at 6, 12 and 18
months with annual boosters. New vaccines that target the
protective antigen moiety of the anthrax toxin are being
developed.5
In a recent event on October 9, 2001, a letter
containing anthrax spores were mailed from New Jersey to
Washington, D.C. Five postal workers who handled the mail
suffered from inhalational anthrax. The 2 postal workers
who died had nonspecific prodromal illnesses. One
developed predominantly gastrointestinal symptoms
including nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. Both
ultimately developed respiratory failure, requiring
mechanical ventilation. The duration of illness was 5 days
from onset of symptoms to death. Both died within 24 hours
of hospitalization. Without a clinicians high index of
suspicion, the diagnosis of inhalational anthrax is difficult
during non specific prodromal illness.5,38
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3. Ingestion of infected meat can lead to
gastrointestinal anthrax. Pharyngeal ulcers and edema
necessitate an artificial airway. Hemorrhagic mesenteric
adenitis, ascites, bleeding per rectum and hematemesis may
occur.
Plague is caused by Yersinia pestis, which is an
anaerobic, gram-negative coccobacillus. There is
documented evidence of the use of plague as a biological
weapon, as far back as the 14th century. Plague is
transmitted to humans in one of three ways, by flea vectors
(Xenopsylla Cheopsis) from rodent reservoirs, by animal to
human droplet infection, or by human to human droplet
infection.5 Bubonic, septicemic and pneumonic forms of
infection are recognized. Pneumonic plague is the most
likely result of a deliberate epidemic.5 Bubonic plague has a
mortality rate of 40% and pneumonic plague has a mortality
of 100%, unless treatment is commenced within 24 hours.
Treatment is with Streptomycin 30mg/kg twice daily for 10
days, the alternate are gentamycin, doxycyclin, or
chloramphenicol.5
Tularemia is caused byFrancisella tularensis 39, a
small, aerobic, intracellular, Gram negative coccobacillus.5
Transmission to humans normally takes place after
inoculation by arthropod vectors. The ingestion of infected
meat or inhalation of aerosolized bacteria may also result in
infection. It may be produced by as few as 10-50 organisms.
The more common ulceroglandular form of the disease
occurs after inoculation. The less common but more fatal
(35%, if untreated) typhoidal form of tularemia occurs after
inhalation and presents with fever, anorexia and non
productive cough. Pneumonia may develop and can be
complicated with pleural effusion.
Diagnosis is confirmed by isolation of the organism
in the sputum or blood. Treatment is with streptomycin
30mg/kg every 12 hours for 10-14 days5 or Gentamicin 3-5
mg/kg/day for 10-14 days. A live attenuated vaccine is
available. 5
Principles of Management
A multi disciplinary approach will be necessary to
address emergency medical and emergency public health
needs.19 The first step is to identify, demarcate and cordon
off the contaminated area. Definitive identification of the
agent may take several hours or even days, clinical signs
and symptoms in exposed individuals are useful indicators
of the likely agent, and will be critical in guiding emergency
medical care.19
1. Initial Management in Hospital and ICU
Disaster planning for managing a chemical or
biological attack must be developed and realistic training
should be provided to ensure effective response to an actual
terrorist event.40 Triage of individuals exposed to a CBW
attack poses several challenges, but the underlying
principles are the same as for any multiple casualty
incident.19 A triage station should be established in the hot
zone to assist in determining priorities for resuscitation,
decontamination, pharmacological therapy, and site
evacuation. It is a dynamic process and should occur at
every stage of patient management.
Triage can be classified as:
i. Primary: at site of disaster, and
ii. Secondary: when patient arrives in hospital.
Patients are divided into 4 groups of treatment
category:9
1. Immediate life saving treatment required 
immediately
2. Delayed treatment can be delayed without 
harm
3. Minimal walking wounded
4. Expectant death inevitable
Initial categorization of the patients is very important in the
management of mass casualties involving the chemical and
biological agents.
II.  Decontamination
Decontamination may not be necessary if the victim
has been exposed to vapor alone, but rapid decontamination
may be required if exposure is to liquid or aerosolized form
of an agent.3,41 When indicated, decontamination should be
performed as close to the scene as possible (i.e. in the warm
zone), and ideally before patient transportation.19 Removal
or neutralization of CBW agents should be done to limit
human exposure. Personal or small-scale decontamination
may be instigated by dilution [showering], or use of
chemical agents [soap or hypochlorite solution].
Decontamination in the ambulatory reception area will
minimize exposure of hospital staff. Health personnel
should be trained in the use of protective equipment which
includes face masks, chemical resistant gloves, splash suits,
and air purifying respirators. Detection equipment is
required to monitor levels of CBW agents. Priority is given
to lifesaving treatment over decontamination. It is
preferable for the patients to decontaminate themselves.
III.  Protection of the Staff
Medical responders may be required to work in
protective clothing and masks19,40, but the hospital staff may
not have access to protective equipments. Therefore, it is
essential to insist on effective decontamination procedures
to be carried out before hospital admission. Barrier
protection will make care of patients more difficult and
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increase the risks of heat, fatigue, and isolation stress for
medical personnel.40,41 Strategies to decrease infection rates
include:
1. Isolation of patients for droplets, body fluids, blood
and secretions 
2. Correct disposal of clinical waste
3. Basic hygiene
4. Vaccination
5. Post exposure prophylaxis
IV.  Definitive Management
The rapid identification of the causative agent may
assist in determining early medical and public health
interventions. Definitive identification may require the
facilities of specialized analytical laboratory and generally
requires some time. Clinical manifestations in the exposed
individuals may be the most useful indicators of the likely
agent and will be critical in guiding emergency medical
care. In addition, the samples of air, soil, water, munitions,
and biological materials may be required to precisely
identify the agent and to quantify the level of exposure.
Management is generally supportive, unless a definitive
diagnosis has been established, and a specific antidote is
available.
V.  Public Education
The use of public warning and information systems
will be critical to inform the community about the nature of
the incident and the appropriate measures that they can take
to protect themselves.42 Timely and accurate information
will assist in minimizing panic in the affected community.
Measures to reduce exposure of the public to chemical
agents include evacuation, sheltering in place, and the
distribution of gas masks  when  nerve gases are
suspected.43-45
Apart from controlling a specific event, continuing
public education regarding disaster planning and
management may play a very significant role in the ultimate
outcome.  
Conclusion
Education of the public and institutional
preparedness can mitigate the horror of CBW agents. The
media can play an active prevention role, by realistically
educating the public about the impact of CBW attack, as the
threats posed by biological weapons are likely to continue
into the future.19 The use of public warning systems, will be
critical to inform the community about the nature of the
incident, and the appropriate measures that they can take to
protect themselves.46 The stresses associated with a
biological terrorist attack could create, high numbers of
acute and potentially chronic psychiatric casualties who
must be recognized, diagnosed and treated to facilitate
triage and medical care.40
Every effort should be made to ensure safety of
personnel and other patients. Inadequate personnel
protection reduces the efficiency and efficacy of the medical
response. Despite the alarming projected mortality statistics
quoted for a significant CBW attack, actual mortality has
been relatively low. Morbidity, however, has been high;
reflecting a lack of medical preparedness for such an attack.
Only by planning, and investing, in the right training and
defensive measures, we can decrease the risks, disruptions,
and casualty morbidity and mortality. By pre-empting and
improving our readiness to respond to terrorism, many lives
can be saved and terrorists denied their goal of creating
panic and crises situations.46
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Case Reports
Severe Hypercalcemia in Tuberculosis
A. Soofi, A. Malik, J. Khan, S. Muzaffar*
Departments of Medicine and Pathology*, The Aga Khan University, Karachi.
Introduction
Hypercalcemia is known to occur in granulomatous
diseases.1 Sarcoidosis is the most common granulomatous
disease causing hypercalcemia. Tuberculosis, fungal
granulomas, berryliosis and lymphomas are other
conditions that are associated with disorders of calcium
metabolism.2 Hypercalcemia, although occurs infrequently,
is a well recognized complication of active tuberculosis.
Severe hypercalcemia has been rarely reported in literature.
The reported incidence of hypercalcemia in TB varies
widely between countries, probably because of variations in
the Vitamin D and calcium intake, the amount of sun
exposure and differences in study population.3 We describe
here a case of severe hypercalcemia in a patient with
abdominal tuberculosis.
Case Report
A 55 years old male presented with low grade fever,
generalized weakness, weight loss, abdominal distension
and constipation for 4 months and urinary frequency for 2
months. On examination, he looked cachectic with
distended abdomen. There was no peripheral
lymphadenopathy. Neurological and chest examination
were normal.
Abdominal examination revealed gross ascites.
Laboratory workup showed normocytic normochromic
anemia with a hemoglobin of 10.8 gm/dl, white blood cell
count of 9 x 109/L with normal differentials, albumin of
2.4gm/dl, corrected hypercalcemia of 15.:mg/dl, raised
alkaline phosphatase (764 I.U/L) with normal parathyroid
hormone  level (19.7 pg/ml) and progressive renal failure.
His serum creatinine rose from 0.9mg/dl two months prior
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